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No-Fault Auto Insurance: Back By
Popular (Market) Demand?
JEFFREY O'CONNNELL*
In America, there are three ways to get rich. You can work hard (but
that's no fun). You can win a lottery (perfect-except for the long odds).
Or you can get in a car wreck and sue. Due to the publicity that surrounds
astronomical jury awards for such dubious injuries as "whiplash," it's this
last path to wealth-the fender bender-that sometimes seems to offer the
truest promise.
Foreigners must be mystified by those American bumper stickers that
say, "GO AHEAD, HIT ME-I COULD USE THE MONEY!" This,
thinks the visitor from abroad, truly is the land of opportunity, where you
can acquire great wealth just by getting your Ford bashed up.
But closer inspection shows this system contains more tarnish than shine.'
Under most forms of insurance, after one proves one is injured,
one is reimbursed by one's own insurer for one's economic losses. But
in the tort system, one must prove a case against someone else's in-
surer showing not only that one was injured, but that it was someone
else's fault. One must thus be prepared to go to court, after typical
delays of several years, where one's fate turns on the vagaries of (by
definition) inexpert jurors, with the award (assuming there is one)
cut by as much as half because of a lawyer's contingent fee and
other litigation expenses. To make matters worse, tort law consist-
ently undercompensates the more seriously injured while routinely
overcompensating the less seriously injured. The key to this overcom-
pensation is payment for "pain and suffering" which, in most cases
does not track actual discomfort or agony, but rather, amounts to a
routine multiple of three or four times medical expenses. Claimants
are thereby encouraged to run up their medical bills, in turn creating
* John Allan Love Professor of Law, University of Virginia; B.A., 1951,
Dartmouth College; J.D., 1954, Harvard University.
1. Spiro & Mirvisn, Whose No-Fault is it Anyway?, WASH. MONTHLY, Oct.
1989, at 24.
huge incentives for chicanery and even naked fraud. All this makes
auto insurance, at even low levels of coverage, so expensive that
mandatory limits are kept low (typically $10,000 to $20,000), with
the further result that there is often relatively little coverage availa-
ble to pay the more seriously injured.' All of this in turn, adds up to
a system that is dilatory, fortuitous, expensive, and inefficient. Only
forty-four cents of every premium dollar actually goes to vic-
tims-and of that forty-four cents only 14.5 cents pays for what
most people buy insurance for, namely, economic loss.3
Faced with the seemingly ever-rising insurance costs needed to
feed this legal maw, consumer activists in California (led by the re-
doubtable Ralph Nader) succeeded, against massive insurance indus-
try opposition, in getting California voters in November 1988 to
adopt an initiative, Proposition 103 (Prop. 103). It called for a
twenty percent rollback from rates prevailing in November 1987,
and a further discount of twenty percent for the more than eighty
percent of motorists it defined as "good drivers." 4 But the initiative
did nothing significant to change the underlying system of tort law
arguably causing the high rates in the first place.
Flushed with success, consumer activists are pushing replicas of
Prop. 103 in many other states." But the most obvious answer to the
ills of auto insurance is no-fault insurance, which does purport to
address the underlying causes of its malfunctioning. Under no-fault,
each motorist recovers only his economic losses (not damages for
pain and suffering) from his own insurance company without regard
to who was at fault in the accident. That way, the two variables
causing most of the problems under auto insurance-establishing
who was at fault, and paying for pain and suffering-disappear.6
The improvements in auto insurance under no-fault are borne out by
a 1985 Department of Transportation study: approximately twice as
many accident victims are compensated under no-fault; practically
all no-fault payments are made within one year of injury (as opposed
to only half of tort awards); and average benefits under no-fault are
seventy-nine percent greater.7
2. For a description of the difficulties plaguing auto insurance as it applies to
personal injury, see J. O'CONNELL & C. KELLY, THE BLAME GAME 67-72, 113-17, 123-
27 (1987); O'Connell & Joost, Giving Motorists A Choice Between Fault and No-Fault
Insurance, 72 VA. L. REV. 61, 61-72 (1986).
3. O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault
Insurance for Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REV. 501, 504-06 (1976).
4. Nasar, Hard Road Ahead for Auto Insurers, FORTUNE, May 8, 1989, at 99.
5. Id.
6. For a description of no-fault auto insurance, see O'Connell & Joost, supra note
2, at 63-67.
7. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, COMPENSATING AUTO ACCIDENT ViCTIMS: A
FOLLOw-UP REPORT ON NO-FAULT AUTO INSURANCE EXPERIENCES 3, 4, 6, 113-17(1985) [hereinafter DOT REPORT]; ALL-INDUSTRY RESEARCH COUNCIL (AIRAC),
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And yet, many states have not enacted any kind of no-fault; they
continue to rely on traditional tort law to compensate traffic victims.
Admittedly, some states which have enacted no-fault laws nonethe-
less continue to suffer overly high premiums along with festering
consumer discontent. But the problem is not no-fault itself; it is the
type of laws state legislatures enacted during the early and mid-
1970s. Spurred on by trial lawyers' lobbies, legislatures undermined
no-fault laws by allowing too many motorists to have it both ways:
that is, to collect no-fault benefits and then to sue the other driver
anyway.
Indeed, even relatively good no-fault laws (like New York's), as
we shall see,9 result in more unnecessarily high costs for tort liability
insurance. Under the pure tort system, victims are often without
funds to cover accruing medical expenses, lost wages, and other
losses while their case is battled. So claimants often settle for rela-
tively little rather than undergo the delay and uncertainty of final
resolution of a tort claim. But, with a tort system bolstered by no-
fault benefits (along with growing coverage for health care costs by
private insurance as well as Medicare and Medicaid), victims are
guaranteed resources which enable them to energetically pursue a
tort claim (after hiring a lawyer at no initial cost on a contingent
basis). This leads to even higher costs for the tort claims that are left
under no-fault laws.10 That, at least, is one side of the story.
At this point, a major obstacle to reforming our auto insurance
system is that the proponents of no-fault and those supporting fault-
based insurance are hurling accusations at each other about the re-
spective merits and demerits of tort liability and no-fault insur-
ance." Hapless legislators and their constituents are understandably
confused by the cacophony. Cutting through the confusion, Califor-
nia State Senator Quentin Kopp recently asked a provocative ques-
tion: "[W]hy should the legislature, or the voters, be forced to
choose between these two insurance alternatives? Why not offer con-
sumers a choice in the marketplace?"' 2
COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1989) [hereinafter
AIRAC].
8. O'Connell & Jost, supra note 2, at 67-75.
9. See infra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
10. O'Connell & Joost, supra note 2, at 71-72; O'Connell, Must Health and Disa-
bility Insurance Subsidize Wasteful Injury Suits?, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1055, 1061
(1989).
11. O'Connell & Joost, supra note 2, at 61-62.
12. Q. Kopp, GUEST ARTICLE FOR FUCHS PUBLICATIONS 1-2 (Apr. 12, 1989) (on
file with author).
Out of Senator Kopp's thoughtful question comes this proposal:
Why not offer a choice? What follows here is a suggested way of
implementing such a system. It is a proposal outlining an actual bill
already before several state legislatures in one form or another.
Here is how it could work. Consumers would be allowed to choose
between fault-based and no-fault insurance for their automobiles. If
two motorists with no-fault policies collide, no problem. Each col-
lects from his own insurer without regard to fault. Likewise, if each
carries only liability insurance, no problem. The two claim against
each other based on fault.
If, however, a no-fault and fault-based motorist collide, the solu-
tion embodied in the choice-based bill grows out of our current sys-
tem of coverage of motorists injured by uninsured motorists. 3 The
bill would treat no-fault insureds as in effect uninsured motorists,
allowing recovery of tort damages by motorists covered by tort liabil-
ity insurance against their own insurer based on tort rights. Such
coverage would be termed "inverse liability." On the other hand, the
no-fault driver, covered by his own no-fault insurance policy for
medical costs and wage losses, could neither sue nor be sued based
on fault. Although liability insurance policy costs might rise for
fault-based insureds as a result of the larger class of "uninsured mo-
torists" (all those buying no-fault), liability premiums for fault-
based insureds would correspondingly decrease because none of the
no-fault insureds could claim against motorists carrying fault-based
insurance.14
This choice plan seeks to insulate the costs of no-fault coverage
from those of tort liability; no-fault motorists would no longer be
forced to subsidize tort litigation, as they are under present mixed
systems. At the same time, other motorists will no longer be required
to surrender involuntarily their rights to be paid (even for pain and
suffering) based on who was at fault, as also now happens under
13. Concerning uninsured motorist coverage, see A. WIDISS, UNINSURED AND UN-
DERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE (2d ed. 1987). Uninsured motorist coverage (UM)
pays up to the limit specified in the policy when the insured or others in the insured
vehicle are injured by an uninsured or hit-and-run driver. Thus, the insured's own insurer
pays what the injured person was eligible to recover from the other uninsured, at-fault
driver. Underinsured motorist coverage (UIM) similarly pays the insured and other occu-
pants of his vehicle when the at-fault other driver is insured, but with low limits.
For a cogent criticism of some features of these coverages, see Schwartz, A Proposal
for Tort Reform: Reformulating Uninsured Motorist Plans, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 419
(1987). But these inadequacies are in substantial measure a function of (a) the inadequa-
cies of fault-based coverage, and (b) attempts by the courts to expansively and (expen-
sively) provide more payouts under such coverage. At least under the reform suggested
here, an alternative is provided to fault-based coverage-including to UM and UIM cov-
erages themselves.
14. O'Connell & Joost, supra note 2, at 79. For a draft bill incorporating the idea,
see O'Connell, A Draft Bill to Allow Choice Between No-Fault and Fault Based Auto
Insurance, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 143 (1990).
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mixed systems.
The figures in the table below illustrate the increase in benefits per
premium dollar that can be provided under no-fault insurance versus
tort liability. In the first place, states having even high levels of no-
fault benefits (such as New York with $50,000) save substantial
amounts in total premiums applicable to bodily injury. (The table is
not concerned with property damage which, except in Michigan, is
not covered by no-fault insurance.) In New York, the pure premium
(defined in footnote a of the table) is estimated' to have been thirty
percent lower in 1987 than it would have been had a no-fault law not
been enacted ($198.48 - $138.12 = $60.36/$198.48 = 0.30). But,
even more significant is how relatively little the high no-fault benefits
cost as a percentage of the total New York pure premium despite
New York's high threshold ("significant bodily impairment") ban-
ning about eighty-five percent of all tort suits for bodily injury. No-
fault benefits contributed to only thirty-six percent of the total pure
premium ($49.78/$138.12 = 0.36). In other words, the relatively
few tort claims preserved over New York's high threshold contrib-
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As a further illustration of the comparative benefits of no-fault
versus tort, the New York figures indicate that if a state without a
no-fault law were to offer motorists a choice of buying regular tort
liability versus no-fault coverage with $50,000 in benefits (which in
New York covers over ninety percent of all motoring victims for over
ninety percent of their losses), the reduction in pure premium would
be in the vicinity of seventy-five percent ($49.78/$198.48 = 0.25).16
And that does not take into account savings stemming from the fact
that the pure premium under no-fault is disproportionately higher
than under tort liability since legal defense fees are far lower under
no-fault, and defense fees are excluded from the calculation of pure
premiums.1a
Admittedly, more than one-third of all motorists in New York and
elsewhere carry more than $50,000 in liability insurance.'" Thus, it
could be argued that providing only $50,000 in no-fault benefits,
along with eliminating all tort claims, lessens the protection provided
under current law. But there are several answers to that. New
York-like most states-requires only $20,000 in tort liability limits
for bodily injury because such coverage is so costly even at low lim-
its. (To require higher limits would be deemed politically unfeasible.
Even at low limits, around twenty percent of motorists in California
refuse to pay the premium, remaining uninsured-and the percent-
age vastly exceeds fifty percent in the inner cities of many major
metropolitan areas."') In addition, any payment from whatever lim-
16. It will be noted that these figures assume that no-fault replaces not only tort
liability, but uninsured (and underinsured) coverage-which is arguably the case: once
one insures oneself (and one's family) at limits one deems adequate, one can be seen as
no longer dependent on coverage from third parties, whether insured or uninsured. In
other words, only those dependent on payment from third parties need coverage for unin-
sured motorists.
17. See supra p. 6, table, note a.
18. DISTRIBUTION OF POLICY LIMITS
Policy Limits (000) Bodily Injury Uninsured Motorist* Underinsured Motorist*
10/20 4.7% 6.0 19.0%
15/30 11.2 25.9 10.1
20/40 4.3 8.0 4.5
25/50 17.8 23.0 18.5
50/100 17.6 10.2 13.4
100/300 27.6 13.8 3.2
Over 100,000
Per Person 4.5 1.4 2.5
Other Split Limits 3.6 8.2 4.2
Single Limit 8.6 3.5 4.5
100% 100% 100%
*See supra note 13 and accompanying text. This table is taken from Table 3-13 in the
AIRAC Study, supra note 7.
19. San Francisco Chron., Oct. 4, 1989, at A9; L.A. Times, Nov. 23, 1986, at 1,
col. 1.
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its the other motorist may be carrying (plus whatever limit may be
carried in uninsured motorist and under'insured motorist coverages)
will be fortuitous and dilatory, depending on the vicissitudes of prov-
ing a tort claim. So if one wanted more protection than $50,000, one
would be better advised to buy more than $50,000 in no-fault bene-
fits than to depend on suing in tort above a threshold. Note, for ex-
ample, the figures for New Jersey-comparable in many ways to
New York-where unlimited no-fault benefits result in a pure pre-
mium of only $91.17.20
The availability of devices whereby the motorist can choose-but
not be compelled-to buy no-fault insurance arguably changes the
terms of the whole no-fault debate. As indicated earlier, legislatures
have for years been baffled and buffeted by the competing and
cacophonous claims-actuarial and otherwise-of those who advo-
cate and those who animadvert no-fault insurance. The result has
been either failure to enact no-fault systems, or enactment of mixed
systems allowing both no-fault and tort recoveries. But a law al-
lowing consumers to choose between no-fault and tort liability means
legislators need not bet exclusively on one or the other of the com-
peting coverages and claims. Rather, a legislature can undertake the
much less daunting task of letting the two coverages compete one
with the other.2 (That will mean healthy pressure, by the way, to
keep the no-fault system operating effectively-for example by guar-
anteeing that benefits track inflation-in order to compete with the
tort system.2 ) It is one thing, after all, for the trial bar and other
opponents of no-fault to assert that no-fault is so bad that motorists
ought not be forced to buy it; it is quite another to assert that it is so
bad that motorists ought not be allowed to buy it even if they want
to.
20. Note further that on the whole, the state of New Jersey is more urbanized and
congested than New York state, much more of which (upstate) is rural. Note though,
that New Jersey's no-fault benefits include only $5,200 for wage loss.
One further point about New York: Perhaps nothing illustrates better the efficacy of
no-fault than that it works so comparatively well in New York-a state probably more
prone to social ills of all kinds than any other in the nation. If no-fault works there, it
can arguably work anywhere. But even in New York, allowing motorists a choice be-
tween no-fault only versus tort liability (supplemented or not by no-fault) would further
improve things for most motorists.
21. Versions of such a "choice" bill have been introduced in Arizona, California,
and Maryland, and are being prepared in Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania,
as well as in the Canadian province of Ontario. See infra note 41.
22. The tort system-being driven by jury verdicts which heavily influence settle-
ments as well-does track inflation; workers' compensation benefits generally have
not-they are statutorily defined.
Three separate but intertwined questions deserve further discus-
sion: (1) What level of no-fault benefits should be required of those
who choose no-fault and fault-based insurance? (2) What should be
done (if anything) about losses suffered above the required lim-
its-either no-fault or fault-based? (3) How should we deal with the
emotional question of freeing no-fault insureds from tort liability
under circumstances that might be deemed unconscionable?
Taking up the last question first, the bill embodying this proposal
provides that despite the tort exemption normally accompanying the
no-fault option, an accident victim retains a cause of action against
anyone driving under the influence of drugs or intoxicating liquor, or
anyone guilty of intentionally causing harm. Such a provision pre-
serves the tort rights of victims of particularly egregious conduct by
no-fault insureds. 3
As to the first question, the level of required benefits, the bill does
not change the level of tort liability limits required under prevailing
state law. But, how about the level of required no-fault benefits? It
would be much more feasible politically to simply eliminate all tort
claims (except intentional, or alcohol or drug related torts) for those
electing no-fault if no-fault limits were sufficiently high that very
few no-fault insureds would suffer losses higher than their cover-
age.24 Data indicate that only about five percent of motorists are in-
sured for more than $100,000.25 As a result, a level of $100,000 in
no-fault benefits would leave very few motorists with less possible
coverage than they could collect under the tort system. Granted that
those few victims are the most seriously injured persons, but keep in
mind how cruelly such victims are often treated by the tort system;
relatively few motorists carry very high limits, and even if one col-
lides with such a driver, the applicable tort liability might well be
nonexistent or greatly scaled down by one's own contributory
negligence.
At the other end of the spectrum, requiring even $100,000 in no-
fault limits-not to speak of higher coverage-might well be
counterproductive. For each increment of $10,000 in benefits, a cer-
tain number of less-affluent motorists may decline to insure them-
23. A further provision provides that a victim of an accident caused by such guilty
conduct by a no-fault insured has a right in the alternative to claim against such a guilty
driver for no-fault benefits up to the amount specified in the no-fault driver's policy, plus
attorney's fees. Furthermore, any party providing other coverage to the victim has a right
of subrogation against such a guilty driver. Note that a guilty party claimed against for
only economic loss would probably be inclined to settle such a claim quickly rather than
risk paying full scale tort liability. This means, therefore, a victim of such a guilty party,
not wanting to undergo possibly prolonged litigation, can claim for the lesser but more
prompt benefits available under no-fault insurance.
24. O'Connell & Joost, supra note 2, at 74 n.42, 80 n.55; see also supra notes 18-
22 and accompanying text.
25. See supra text accompanying note 15 (table).
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selves at all. Indeed since, as is often indicated,26 lowering insurance
costs is the prime desideratum of auto insurance reform, the bill pro-
posed here requires only the same level of no-fault benefits as is re-
quired under tort liability insurance ($15,000 to $20,000 in most ju-
risdictions) Of course, more affluent motorists will carry more
than the minimum limits, as happens under tort liability insurance.2 8
That in turn raises the second question: What should be done (if
anything) about losses suffered above the required limits carried by
either no-fault or tort liability insureds? The proposed bill provides
that a victim of any accident retains the right to bring a tort claim,
despite any tort exemption of no-fault insureds, for damages in ex-
cess of any applicable inverse liability for no-fault coverage available
to the victim. To the extent that a large majority of motorists elects
no-fault limits of $100,000,29 this provision will not often come into
play. In other words, only in the rare case that a victim's losses ex-
ceed $100,000 would a tort claim normally be made.
On the other hand, the provision preserving the victim's tort claim
will more often come into play in dealing with members of a family
whose motorists provided either no or low limits of no-fault or tort
coverage. It would be hard to justify, for example, leaving without
much or any remedy a small, poor child run down by the tortious
conduct of an affluent no-fault insured. In such a case, if the parent
of such a child had provided no or low coverage, the injustice would
be manifest. But in order to control the cost of such preserved
claims, the victim will be foreclosed from pursuing the claim further
if the no-fault insured tenders to the victim within ninety days, after
either the accident or the claim, a written offer to pay no-fault bene-
fits"0 covering economic loss in excess of any other coverage available
26. N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1989, at 52, cols. 1-3.
27. DOT REPORT, supra note 7, at 22, 25-64. On the option of motorists choosing
$15,000 versus $100,000 of no-fault benefits levels, see infra notes 33-36 and accompany-
ing text.
28. See supra text accompanying note 15 (table).
29. See supra text accompanying note 28.
30. Note that there is no limit on the amount of benefits for economic loss which
must be offered under this provision. This means that when a defendant-motorist's liabil-
ity insurance limits are relatively low compared to his victim's net economic loss, an
insurer will not be inclined to make "an early offer." But in the great mass of cases
where losses are substantially less than the defendant's coverage, an early offer becomes
feasible.
Another possibility is to authorize the offer to the victim of whatever no-fault benefits
the offeror carries, subject to a minimum of $100,000, to cover economic loss in excess of
any other coverage applicable to the victim, thereby foreclosing pursuit of an ordinary
tort claim. This coverage, being in excess of collateral sources, means that payment of
1003
to the victim plus attorney's fees.3 1 After such an offer, the victim
will retain a tort claim only if he or she proves beyond a reasonable
doubt (or perhaps by clear and convincing evidence) that the no-
fault insured was guilty of wanton conduct. On the other hand, if no
such tender is made, the victim retains his right to pursue a normal
tort claim for lack of ordinary care by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. Under this provision, a victim will always have the right to
claim for losses above either inverse liability or no-fault coverage.32
The defendants are given an incentive, but are not compelled, to pay
their victims expeditious benefits equivalent to those available under
no-fault (covering only economic loss) rather than spending precious
resources litigating fault and the value of pain and suffering-as well
as possibly paying the latter.
Such an "early offers" approach will work better, for example,
than simply allowing an injury victim to claim in tort for only eco-
nomic loss (and not for pain and suffering) above his no-fault or
inverse liability coverage. Under this latter approach, the defendant's
insurer will often be inclined to resist payment of the tort claim for
economic loss in the realization that its exposure is thus limited to
only economic loss. This seems often to happen for tort claims for
property damage where insurers have no reason to fear exposure to
payment for noneconomic loss. Under the early offers approach, on
the other hand, an insurer is required to earn the right to pay a tort
claimant for only economic loss by promptly (within ninety days)
offering to do so. And yet, a defendant with either no or very doubt-
ful tort liability-or no or low tort liability insurance-will not be
induced to make an early offer because of the low probability of full-
scale tort liability.
It is important to note that under the bill proposed here, motorists
electing no-fault insurance are not required to carry liability insur-
ance. This means that the poor, with no or few assets to protect, can
buy only no-fault insurance protecting themselves and their families
collateral sources will not count toward exhausting the $100,000 limit. In effect, then,
though duplicate payments are not made for the same loss under this proposal, a party
suffering $200,000 in economic losses who is paid $100,000 from collateral sources will
be eligible for a further $100,000 in no-fault benefits. On the options as to $15,000 ver-
sus $100,000 no-fault benefit levels, see infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
31. When a level of benefits equal to those payable under no-fault is payable under
an early offer approach, benefits will include reasonable expenses incurred by the victim
in collecting such benefits, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Such a provision seems
necessary since otherwise a claimant will likely end up not being fully reimbursed for his
losses, in that under liability claims normally an attorney's fee is taken out of payments
made for pain and suffering. Morris, Liability for Pain and Suffering, 59 COLUM. L.
REV. 476, 477 (1959).
32. For the origins of the "early offers" idea for evading full scale tort liability, see
O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused: Foreclosure of Personal Injury Claims By
Defendants' Prompt Tender of Claimants' Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 589
(1982).
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for medical bills and any wage loss. Nor are those injured by the
poor disadvantaged by this arrangement compared to what happens
under tort liability insurance, since the poor are so likely to be either
uninsured or underinsured. Note further that even those covered by
no-fault insurance have the right to claim for losses in excess of their
no-fault benefits, subject to the right of a no-fault defendant to make
"early offers."
In order to avoid compelling the poor to buy more insurance than
they can readily afford (and thus perversely encouraging them to go
completely uninsured), the proposed bill allows motorists to buy ei-
ther $15,000 or $100,000 (or more) in no-fault coverage, thereby
meeting the mandatory insurance requirement at either level.33 The
bill could further provide that those buying only $15,000 limits will
still be liable in tort for losses above any and all coverage applicable
to those whom they tortiously injure, but they would not have the
right to limit their tort liability exposure by making early offers to
pay net economic loss up to $100,000. Because, however, there
would be no requirement that tort liability insurance be carried, the
poor, prompted to buy only $15,000 in no-fault coverage in order to
save money, need not be concerned any more than they are now
about carrying no or low tort liability coverage to protect often non-
existent assets. On the other hand, the more affluent will be induced
to buy at least $100,000 in no-fault coverage to get not only the
benefit of such coverage, but of making early offers, with concomi-
tantly lower costs for their excess liability coverage.
All this raises two additional objections to the choice-based bill.
First, since no-fault insureds buying full coverage of $100,000 re-
main liable for losses in excess of inverse liability, no-fault, or other
coverages (subject to being able to make early offers), persons buy-
ing $15,000 of either liability (including inverse liability) or no-fault
coverage will more often be able to claim against no-fault insureds
than will those buying fuller no-fault coverage. This can arguably bejustified by considerations of income redistribution:34 it is the poorer
who will buy minimum coverage (under either tort, including inverse
liability, or no-fault coverage). Under liability insurance, the
poor-carrying either no or low liability insurance--can similarly
draw more from the pool of liability insurance dollars than they pay
33. See supra text accompanying note 27.
34, Cf. O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Defendants' Payment for Pain and Suf-fering in Return for Payment of Claimants' Attorneys' Fees, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 333,
356-58.
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into it. (Though in fact, they may not do so. The poor are often
reluctant to invoke the legal process; in addition the poor suffer no or
less wage loss and lower medical bills than the affluent.3 ) Granted,
the proposed plan preserves at least the theoretical advantage of the
poor. In fact, it also advantages the affluent by guaranteeing those
who buy no-fault that they will be covered up to high limits irrespec-
tive of fault, and by limiting their tort exposure with the early offer
provision, which allows the option of paying only for net economic
loss payable periodically. This further means that the temptation of
tort claimants under normal tort liability to pad claims will largely
disappear. 6
A second possible objection to the choice-based bill as structured
above should be discussed. Because the inverse liability device is de-
rived from uninsured motorist coverage, victims of tortfeasors who
have chosen no-fault coverage lose their right to claim against such
tortfeasors. Three arguments are offered in answer to that: (1) tort
recoveries are almost never paid today by tortfeasors themselves, but
by liability insurers; (2) with the rise in auto insurance costs (caused
by the excesses of the tort liability system) and the concomitant rise
in uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, more and more
tort claims are today asserted against one's own insurer and not
against tortfeasors;3 7 and (3) according to empirical evidence, even
motorists aggrieved to the point that they make successful personal
injury claims do not feel hostility against the tortious drivers who
injured them, nor do they find assuagement from tort payment.38
But, to the extent one rejects these arguments, one course to fol-
low would be to abandon the inverse liability device and follow the
Kentucky optional no-fault auto insurance law which never takes
away tort rights from those electing tort liability insurance. In Ken-
tucky, in a collision between two no-fault insureds, neither can assert
tort rights. But when a tort liability insured and a no-fault motorist
collide, tort liability claims remain for each against the other-as, of
course, is the case with two tort liability insureds.3 9 Although under
the Kentucky system, those who choose no-fault must buy tort liabil-
ity coverage for claims against them by tort liability insureds, if in
35. O'Connell, supra note 3, at 518.
36. AIRAC, supra note 7. For further discussion of "claims padding," see
O'Connell, supra note 34, at 334-40.
37. As legal philosopher Jules Coleman has suggested, the purposes of tort dam-
ages do not require that they be paid by tortfeasors. Coleman, Book Review, 97 YALE
L.J. 1233 passim (1988) (reviewing W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF TORT LAW (1987)).
38. J. O'CONNELL & R. SIMON, PAYMENT FOR PAIN & SUFFERING: WHO WANTS
WHAT, WHEN & WHY? 26-28, 34, 46 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 26-28, 34,
46.
39. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.39-010 to 304.39-340 (Baldwin 1989).
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fact no-fault coverage costs substantially less than tort liability cov-
erage-which is very likely to be the case 4 -- exposure to tort liabil-
ity may not be all that great. Ninety-nine percent of Kentucky mo-
torists elect no-fault coverage. (That high percentage may be
influenced, however, by the fact that there is a state mandated rate
differential advantageous to those electing no-fault, along with the
fact that motorists first must affirmatively reject no-fault in order to
avoid such coverage.)
On the other hand, given the fact that insurers will not be sure in
advance of the potential mix between tort liability and no-fault in-
sureds, initial reductions in premiums may be significantly less com-
pared to those which would occur by use of the inverse liability de-
vice, under which insurers can confidently know that no no-fault
insureds are exposed to liability in tort to those electing no-fault in-
surance. Still, the Kentucky device may be a prudent course in states
like Arizona with arguable constitutional barriers to the abolition or
limitation of tort rights for personal injury victims.4 The Kentucky
solution also has the .psychological and political advantage that those
electing tort coverage never lose their tort rights.
In closing, it might be noted that even allowing motorists to
choose between no-fault and fault-based liability insurance will seem
to some a big step.42 A more modest way of experimenting with the
choice idea would be to limit the choice to coverage under uninsured
and underinsured motorist coverage. 43 That change would be rela-
tively modest in that all claims for such coverages are already uni-
versally made against one's own insurer.44 Thus, a motorist would
simply be asked to decide whether, after accidents with uninsured or
underinsured motorists, he wishes to be paid by his own insurer on a
fault or no-fault basis. Note too that many jurisdictions give motor-
ists a choice whether to purchase uninsured motorist coverage at
all.45 Thus, a motorist would now be given three choices: no unin-
sured motorist coverage; uninsured motorist coverage with inverse li-
ability; or uninsured motorist on a no-fault basis. The attractiveness
40. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
41. A bill embodying this concept has been drafted by the author working in col-
laboration with Project New Start, a coalition of consumer advocates, community or-
ganizers, insurers, and others, and has been introduced in Arizona. But, for a discussion
indicating that the constitutional barriers in states like Arizona may not be as great as
first appears, see J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY 223-27 (1975).
42. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
43. See supra note 13.
44. See supra note 13.
45. A. WIDISS, supra note 13, § 2.5.
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and feasibility of allowing uninsured motorist coverage to be offered
on a no-fault basis is enhanced by the history of such coverage.
When voluntary uninsured motorist coverage was first offered in the
1950s by certain stock companies in New York, a number of mutual
companies offered an endorsement providing benefits for the policy-
holder and members of his family injured in an accident with an
uninsured car, regardless of the legal liability of the uninsured
driver.46 Data derived from experience under such choices would be
invaluable in deciding whether or not to extend choice beyond unin-
sured motorist and underinsured motorist coverages. Under such an
experiment, the insurer would pay its insureds buying no-fault cover-
age up to whatever limits the insured had bought under uninsured or
underinsured motorist coverages, with a right of subrogation (which
would be especially valuable as to the liability coverage of the under-
insured motorist).
SURREBUTTALS
Time and space restraints prevent extensive answers to the
thoughtful pieces of my fellow contributors. But let me make a few
points.
Professor Carr's piece is, I fear, typical of so many economists'
dealing with the law; he allows his rigid premises to drive him to
shaky conclusions. Thus, he asserts: "The real question is the desira-
bility of fault versus the desirability of no-fault. A system which
frees economic agents from liability for the harm they impose on
others results in a reduction in the driving standard of care."'47 By
that token, of course, workers' compensation and compulsory no-
fault auto insurance are condemned. But is Professor Carr really ad-
vocating repeal of workers' compensation? Certainly it is hard to
make a convincing case that freeing employers from tort liability
under workers' compensation has increased the number and severity
of workplace injuries. Even under no-fault auto insurance, where,
unlike workers' compensation, the tortfeasor does not have to pay his
victim no-fault benefits (rather, he simply insures his own and his
family's injuries), there is as much or more research showing no ad-
verse effect on the number and severity of motoring injuries as show-
ing the contrary.8
As for Professor Gaudry's research on the Quebec experience,
cited by Professor Carr, his data did show that the Quebec no-fault
46. N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1955, at 70, cols. 4-5; R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC
PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 122 (1965).
47. Carr, Giving Motorists a Choice Between Fault and No-Fault Insurance: An
Economic Critique, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1087 (1989).
48. O'Connell & Joost, supra note 2, at 87 n.72.
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act was followed by increases in injuries and deaths. But the effect of
no-fault on such increases "is very small, if it exists at all."'49 Rather,
the increase was due to (1) the moral hazard from more people be-
ing insured because the act made insurance compulsory, and (2) the
adverse selection stemming from flat-premium pricing that greatly
reduces auto insurance costs for high risk drivers (such as young
males)-thereby encouraging them to drive, whereas previously they
had tended to be priced off the road.50
Pursuing Gaudry's first point and probing even deeper into Profes-
sor Carr's ukases, liability insurance itself violates Professor Carr's
premise in that it too is a "system which frees economic agents from
liability for the harm they impose on others."51 Is Professor Carr
thereby advocating abolition of liability insurance itself?
Professor Carr is especially concerned about drunk drivers: "One
cannot allow negligent drivers to decide whether or not they will be
liable for the harm they cause to others. One cannot allow drunk
drivers the option of being relieved of the responsibility for the
harm they cause to others."52 But of course, under tort liability in-
surance, drunk drivers do not pay for the harm they cause; their
insurers-and all insureds, drunk and sober-do. Here too, holding
Professor Carr to his consistent conclusions from his premises, does
he advocate that injuries from drunk driving should thereby be unin-
surable? But regardless of his stance in that regard, a choice-based
no-fault system can readily be adjusted to incorporate liability for
driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
According to Professor Carr, "It should be noted that under our
current system of negligence laws, traditional fault systems do offer
consumers choices . . . .Automobile drivers can purchase accident
and disability insurance to protect themselves against loss of income
in the case of accidents in which they are the negligent party."53 But
49. M. GAUDRY, RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACCIDENTS: RELEVANT RESULTS SELECTED
FROM THE DRAG MODEL (Publication No. 544, Centre de Recherche Sur les Transports,
Universit6 de Montr6al, 1987); see also M. GAUDRY, DRAG, UN MODtLE DE LA DE-
MANDE ROUTItRE DES ACCIDENT ET LEUR GRAVITt APPLIQUt AU QUfBEC DE 1956 A
1982 (Publication No. 359, Centre de Recherche sur les Transports, Universit6 de Mon-
treal, 1985) (quoted in O'Connell & Tenser, North America's Most Ambitious No-
Fault: Quebec's Auto Insurance Act, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 917, 928 (1987)).
50. M. GAUDRY, RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACCIDENTS: RELEVANT RESULTS FROM THE
DRAG MODEL (Publication No. 544, Centre de Recherche sur les Transports, Univer-
sit6 de Montrbal, 1987).
51. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
52. Carr, supra note 47, at 1093.
53. Id. at 1074.
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that is precisely the point of no-fault reform: Why should two drivers
adequately insured against auto accidents by first party coverage be,
in effect, required to insure each other all over again with third party
tort liability coverage for those same auto accidents? 54 One can un-
derstand why lawyers-and insurance companies-love all that un-
necessary insurance, leading to large premiums and contingent fees,
but why should it appeal to an economist supposedly concerned with
eliminating waste, not praising it?
As to Professor Carr's confident prediction that bad drivers will
elect no-fault insurance and good drivers fault-based insurance, that
seems by no means as inevitable as he would have us think. Bob
Joost and I have written:
No a priori reason . . . indicates that disproportionate numbers of safe or
unsafe drivers will prefer one form of insurance over the other. Economic
analysis might suggest that unsafe drivers, knowing their lesser likelihood of
recovering in tort, will opt for [no-fault] insurance, and conversely, safer
drivers, knowing their greater likelihood of recovering in tort, will opt for
54. In a 1968 speech Bradford Smith, then president of the Insurance Company of
North America, spoke as follows:
What alternatives are offered to a motorist under the present law? If he
distrusts his chances of recovery under [the fault] . . . system and wants to be
positively assured of recovery, he can buy [accident and health (a &
h)] ... insurance which is readily available and will compensate him
promptly and equitably without regard to legal liability. The difficulty is that
the customer cannot substitute such a direct benefits [a & h] contract for the[fault] . . . contract. For complete protection he must purchase both the [a &
h] . . . policy and the [fault] . . . policy.
Thus, [a & h] . . . insurance, as a solution, is impractical unless the law is
changed to eliminate liability under the [fault] . . . system. To the public,
purchasing [a & h insurance] . . . policies and being required to also
purchase a [fault] policy for the benefit of others and having others required to
purchase [fault] policies for his benefit in the event of legal liability is illogical,
inconvenient, and unnecessarily expensive.
But, up until now, that is the only alternative we have offered to simple
reliance on the [fault] . . . system for recovery of loss due to automobile acci-
dents; and our only explanation has been that it is true that our system involves
a duplication of expenses, but there is also a duplication of benefits. If a claim-
ant is successful in his [fault claim], . . . he will recover this judgment in
addition to whatever he recovers from his [a & h] benefits contract. The public
might well charge that the industry has developed a system requiring a motor-
ist to buy twice as much insurance as he needs, so that in the event he is
injured he may recover twice as many benefits as he needs.
Yes, that sounds preposterous, but that is, in effect, the present position.
So long as the premium for this duplicate coverage is a matter of a dollar or
two, a policyholder might accept this proposition and look upon it like the foot-
ball pool, ignoring insofar as possible the fact that he is the football. But when
the premiums are substantial and grow larger in response to rising hospital
costs, medical costs, automobile repair costs, and legal costs, he rejects the pro-
position. He can hardly be expected to be interested in paying double insurance
premiums. Given the choice, it seems clear that he would prefer to pay the
single premium and forego any double recovery in return for the elimination of
duplication of cost.
Address by Bradford Smith, Jr., Mid-Winter Meeting of the Federation of Insurance
Counsel, Miami, Florida (Feb. 1, 1968).
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traditional [tort] insurance. But one can just as persuasively argue that
safer drivers are more likely to be risk averse and therefore will opt for the
more certain, no-fault insurance payments, even if they are lesser in
amount. Conversely, unsafe drivers, being risk-preferred, will arguably opt
for higher (if less sure) traditional tort insurance payments. 55
Finally, even if it turns out that, disproportionately, unsafe drivers
elect no-fault and safe drivers elect fault-based insurance, there is
nothing to prevent implementation of a scheme of surcharges on un-
safe drivers to correct the imbalance. But we need not inevitably as-
sume that such will be the case any more than we must agree with
any other of the rigid assumptions and conclusions of Professor Carr.
Anyone who comes down on the side of preferring the tort system for
auto accidents would seem to be an unrealistic guide through the
thickets of automobile insurance.
Which brings us to Professor Little. Professor Little believes so
deeply in the tort system, one is inclined to forgive his (uncharacter-
istically) churlish tone. His basic problem is he is an old-fashioned
torts scholar who resents the disruption of pure tort principles by
liability insurance and the focus on compensation for injuries that
insurance has brought with it.5" That, in turn, as with Professor
Carr, causes a certain myopia. Professor Little, like Professor-Carr,
pontificates as follows (Who's getting churlish now? Must be catch-
ing!): "[P]rincipledly, I think any plan that allows people to opt out
of personal accountability for wrongful acts is wrong. Indeed one
person's opting out of liability is a denial of another person's rights
under the law of torts."15 7 Unmentioned by Professor Little are the
huge numbers of poor-in Florida as well as in jurisdictions where
motor vehicle tort liability insurance is compulsory-who find tort
liability so expensive they go uninsured. As a practical matter, they
too are opting "out of personal accountability for wrongful
acts ... [and denying] another person's rights under the law of
torts."58 All this leads, of course, to very expensive uninsured motor-
ist coverage imposed on those remaining in the insurance pool.
Professor Little goes on to bemoan "the hidden zinger in the
55. O'Connell & Joost, supra note 2, at 88 n.74.
56. See Little, Up With Torts, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 861 (1987). In an elegant
piece, Professor Little (rather wistfully) pines for old-fashioned tort law-more extant in
England-focusing on morally culpable behavior, and not on redistribution of losses un-
derwritten by insurance. (Nostalgia is okay in its place, but one must not get carried
away.)




[choice-based] plan as to the poorest among us, [in that] in choosing
the [no-fault] option . . . the poor people would also be choosing to
give up all the rights to both noneconomic and economic damages
that they have under existing tort law." '59 But note, now many of
those same poor are unwilling (or unable-it does not make much
difference which) to redeem others' "rights to both noneconomic and
economic damages . . . under existing tort law."60 So what Profes-
sor Little does not address is the basic injustice of the present sys-
tem, whereby the uninsured (and underinsured), operating "danger-
ous instrumentalities" 6' capable of inflicting huge losses on others,
pay into the insurance mechanism for those they injurie either not at
all or at very low levels, while retaining the right to claim for huge
amounts against those who injure them. Note that in most motorized
countries, without the excesses of America's tort system, everyone,
rich and poor and neither, can be expected to carry tort insurance
coverage capable of meeting high and even unlimited losses.
As to Professor Little's solution, he wants a lot of no-fault cover-
age ($50,000) plus tort liability for bigger cases. But the figures for
New York and other states 2 indicate how very expensive that com-
bination can be--disproportionately so for the tort liability portion.
Professor Little's solution of generous no-fault benefits coupled
with a right to claim in tort above a high threshold raises another
problem-namely, that the huge expense involved in unrestricted
tort claims above a no-fault threshold is not limited to claims against
motorists. One can note, for example, the phenomenon of the huge
rise in so-called "third party" suits by recipients of workers' compen-
sation-suits not against employers (who are exempt from tort liabil-
ity) but against, for example, suppliers of equipment, such as punch
press machines, to the employer. It now turns out that about half
(forty-two percent) of all product liability payments are made for
injuries already covered by workers' compensation.6"
Going beyond workers' compensation, increased social and private
loss insurance benefits generally subsidize aggressive tort litigation
by the insured parties, who are thereby insulated from dire need by
that very same loss coverage. When one combines this with the
59. Id. at 1022.
60. Id.
61. Automobiles were so designated by the Florida courts as long ago as 1920.
Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 446-47, 86 So. 629, 631 (1920).
62. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
63. INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY: A
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS 63 (1977); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE INTER-
AGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY FINAL REPORT OF THE LEGAL STUDIES
VII-85 (1977). For further dramatic confirmation of the dimensions of such "third
party" claims, see L. SOULER, A STUDY OF LARGE PRODUCT LIABILITY CLAIMS CLOSED
IN 1985 (1986).
1012
[VOL. 26: 993, 1989] No-Fault Auto Insurance
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
availability of a lawyer at a no-risk, contingent fee, along with the
"American rule" by which the loser need not pay the winner's coun-
sel fees, the result is that loss insurance beneficiaries increasingly are
encouraged to file a tort claim and resist any relatively quick but low
settlement offer. This is not to say that lawsuits offer what loss insur-
ance rarely does-payment for "pain and suffering" and similar in-
tangible losses.64
This means that benefits paid by no-fault auto insurance can be
expected to excite more aggressive tort claims against, among others,
(1) car makers and suppliers of automobile parts and (2) the govern-
ment and other parties who build and maintain roads. Arguably, so-
ciety does not want to choke off wasteful, inefficient tort litigation in
one area (against motorists) in order to expand litigation in allied
areas (against car makers and the government). There may be a way
to avoid that result, and at the same time encourage prompt, peri-
odic payment of actual economic losses above the amount of auto
insurance benefits: the choice-based no-fault bill could provide that
when a motorist who is eligible for no-fault benefits makes a third-
party claim, the defendant will also have the right to make an "early
offer."' 65 Thus, defendants are provided incentives to offer, within
ninety days, to pay periodically the victim's medical expenses, wage
loss, and other monetary losses not covered by auto no-fault or other
loss insurance applicable to the victim, plus an hourly fee for the
victim's lawyer. As a further feature, the law could provide that a
third party defendant not making such a prompt offer would lose
legal defenses based on the victim's own fault.6 On the other hand,
a defendant making such an offer would foreclose further pursuit of
a tort claim in a normal situation. A claimant refusing such an offer
could only prevail in court if he could show by a higher than normal
standard of proof (such as beyond a reasonable doubt or by clear
and convincing evidence, rather than by a mere preponderance) that
the defendant had been guilty of a higher degree of fault (gross or
wanton conduct, rather than merely negligent conduct or the mere
64. On the general point of loss insurance subsidizing liability insurance claims,
see O'Connell, supra note 10.
65. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
66. On the justification for loss of the defense of the claimant's contributory fault,
see O'Connell, supra note 32, at 606-09. This feature might also be made a part of the
"early offers" proposal as applied to motorists. Or it might be limited to third party
defendants as an extra cost to them alone for the privilege of providing coverage excess
to auto insurance and limited to economic loss.
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presence of a defect in the product),.7
Turning to Craig Brown's piece,68 it carefully emphasizes that he
is only suggesting a further alternative in case some difficulties (he
fairly identifies) under the choice scheme are seen as barriers to its
enactment. But, as he is quick to acknowledge, his proposal raises
some problems of its own. Let me raise a few which may or may not
be persuasive. If the central political problem of auto insurance at
the moment is its high cost, a proposal such as his can be seen as
threatening, raising, as it does, the specter of adverse selection and
therefore, at the least, considerable actuarial uncertainty. Professor
Brown acknowledges that both the plaintiff's own lawyer and his
own (no-fault) insurer will be under a strong incentive to encourage
him to sue in tort (the lawyer to get his tort contingent fee, the first
party no-fault insurer to fob off the claim on the other driver's third
party liability insurer). He argues that, nevertheless, even the seri-
ously injured with relatively good tort claims would be inclined to
accept the prompt certainty of no-fault benefits, coupled with some
additional safeguards he tries to build in, and abandon their rela-
tively uncertain (and sure to be delayed) torts claims. Since he
builds on proposals structured by me for athletic injuries, I might
well be inclined to agree with him. 9 But my schemes are not faced
with the incentive of the no-fault insurer totally avoiding payment if
the no-fault benefits are turned down. (At that point only the liabil-
ity insurer faces possible payment.)
When you stop and think about it though, once you postulate a
plan that commits insurers to make preaccident commitments to of-
fer no-fault benefits to injury victims who are then given a postacci-
dent option of rejecting those benefits to sue in tort, one does not
need a statute, nor does one need to make the cumbersome switch
from third party liability insurance to third party loss insurance.
Any third party liability insurer is free today to make such a pre-
accident commitment for victims seriously injured by the insurer's
insureds ("seriously injured" defined in Brown's or any other way)
above a threshold (also defined in Brown's or any other way), subject
to the victim's right to reject and sue in tort.70 Granted, that would
67. Note that pending universal enactment of such no-fault laws with this "third
party early offers" feature, the temptation will be to sue car makers or other third parties
doing business across the country in a state without such a "third party early offer"
provision. Arguably, however, such suits should be dismissed on the basis of forum non
conveniens. Cf. Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); R. WEINTRAUB, COMMEN-
TARY ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 6.29, at 352 n.5 (3d ed. 1986).
68. Brown, A Choice of Choice: Adding Post-Accident Choice to the Menu of No-
Fault Models, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1095 (1989).
69. See O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault" Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preaccident
Guarantees of Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CAL. L. REV. 898 (1985).
70. See O'Connell, Neo No-Fault Remedies for Medical Injuries: Coordinated
Statutory and Contractual Alternatives, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 125
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not change their exposure to tort claims under the threshold, nor
would Professor Brown's proposal.
But with the exception for athletic injuries mentioned above, in-
surers have not done so. Why not? Well, fear of adverse selection is
one reason.7' They could be wrong but, after all, it is their money
they are refusing to bet on such a scheme, so maybe they know
something Professor Brown and I do not. Another reason admittedly
is the free rider problem. An insurer experimenting with such a
scheme will face start up costs as well the actuarial uncertainty ac-
companying any insurance innovation. If the scheme is successful,
competitors can copy it without facing the same start up costs or
uncertainty. A statute like Professor Brown's compelling all insurers
to start to play the game at the same time does address the free rider
problem, but compelling insurers to try new and untried programs
they do not want to try voluntarily is bound to meet their resistance.
That means such a proposal will excite the opposition of both the
trial bar and the insurance industry-which surely dims its pros-
pects. On the other hand, his proposal is a welcome addition to the
literature.
CONCLUSION
To return to where this article began, allowing motorists to buy
no-fault insurance as a way out of the morass of the tort law would
not only make sense to those foreigners mystified by our litigious
ways, but to many Americans as well.
(discussion of the difference between a plan whereby the insurer is under a pre-accident
obligation to tender no-fault benefits, while the injured party has a postaccident choice
between accepting the tender or pursuing the tort action, as opposed to a plan whereby
the injurer has a postaccident choice between tendering no-fault benefits or risking a tort
suit, while the injured party is under a postaccident obligation to accept the tender of no-
fault benefits if it is made).
71. For an answer to the reverse phenomenon of adverse selection by insurers
against claimants under my offers scheme, see Moore & O'Connell, Foreclosing Medical
Malpractice Claims by Prompt Tender of Economic Loss, 44 LA. L. REv. 1268, 1283-84
(1984); J. O'CONNELL & C. KELLY, supra note 2, at 133-34.
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